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The problem of poor regulatory compliance has been widely reported across private health providers in
developing countries. Less known are the underlying reasons for poor compliance, especially with
regards to the roles played by front-line regulatory staff, and the regulatory institution as a whole. We
designed a qualitative study to address this gap, with the study questions and tools drawing on a con-
ceptual framework informed by theoretical literature on regulation. Data were collected from specialized
drug shops (SDSs) in two rural districts in Western Kenya in 2011 through eight focus group discussions,
and from regulatory staff from organizations governing the pharmaceutical sector through a total of 24
in-depth interviews.
We found that relationships between front-line regulators and SDS operators were a strong inﬂuence
on regulatory behaviour, often resulting in non-compliance and perverse outcomes such as corruption. It
emerged that separate regulatory streams operated in urban and rural locations, based mainly on
differing relationships between the front-line regulators and SDS operators, and on broader factors such
as the competition environment and community expectations. Effective incentive structures for regu-
latory staff were either absent, or poorly linked to performance in regulatory organizations, resulting in
divergences between the purposes of the regulatory organization and activities of front-line staff.
Given the rural-urban differences in the practice environment, the introduction of lower retail practice
requirements for rural SDSs could be considered. This would allow illegally operated shops to be brought
within the regulatory framework, facilitating good quality provision of essential commodities to
marginalized areas, without lowering the practice requirements for the better complying urban SDSs. In
addition, regulatory organizations need to devise incentives that better link the level of effort to rewards
such as professional advancement of regulatory staff.
 2013 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.Introduction
Regulating the private sector allows the government to share
out responsibility for health service provision whilst maintaining
some control over quality and distribution (Aﬁﬁ, Busse, & Harding,
2003; Baldwin & Cave, 1999). Until recently, private health servicesResearch Programme, Box
@gmail.com (F. Wafula).
All rights reserved.faced relatively little scrutiny, with regulating health providers
being seen as part of the process of entrenching professionalization.
This has changed for various reasons, including increased demand
for regulation due to increased numbers of health professions,
more awareness that regulation can lead to monopolization, and
increased realization that certain aspects of health care bear similar
features to other markets and can be regulated similarly (Graddy,
1991; Kumaranayake, 1998).
Health care regulation aims to control some or all of the
following: market entry, competitive practices, remuneration, and
standards and quality, and, to ensure safe use of health care services
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regulation has become more open in developing countries, the
evidence base on which regulations and enforcement strategies
work best, and what factors contribute to observed outcomes, re-
mains weak (Kumaranayake, Mujinja, Hongoro, & Mpembeni,
2000). Some argue that regulation in developing countries either
reﬂects the governments’ unrealistic expectations of what is
achievable, or the desires of professional bodies (Blevins, 1995;
Ensor & Weinzierl, 2007). Some evidence, for instance, suggests
that while regulation plays a role in protecting the public, certain
aspects appear to serve the objectives of professionals and limit
competition (Blevins, 1995; Graddy, 1991; Paul, 1984).
Specialized drug shops
Specialized drug shops (SDSs) play an important role in provi-
sion of health services in Sub-Saharan Africa because they provide
quick and convenient access to medicines, and in some cases,
ﬂexible payment terms to clients (Goodman et al., 2007). The scope
of SDSs varies across countries, but will usually include registered
and unregistered pharmacies and registered and unregistered drug
shops (Wafula, Miriti, & Goodman, 2012). Studies have shown SDSs
to be popular sources of treatment for fever and malaria, diarrhoea,
respiratory diseases, and sexually transmitted illnesses, as well as
for chronic conditions such as hypertension (Chuc et al., 2001;
Garcia, Gotuzzo, Hughes, & Holmes, 1998; Hetzel et al., 2007;
Oparah, Adje, & Enato, 2006). There is increasing interest in how
policy makers can work with SDSs to strengthen health systems.
However, there are concerns over their performance, with studies
showing practices such as dispensing without prescription being
common. Interventions to improve their practices have been
limited mainly to training, with little effort going towards
strengthening regulation (Wafula & Goodman, 2010).
Specialized drug shops are an important part of the Kenyan
health system; with estimates suggesting 26e69% of the popula-
tion visit them for fever (Amin, Marsh, Noor, Ochola, & Snow,
2003; Chuma, Gilson, & Molyneux, 2007; Molyneux, Mung’Ala-
Odera, Harpham, & Snow, 1999). In Kenya, pharmacies are the
only cadre of SDSs that is recognized by law; however, unregis-
tered SDSs have been widely documented (Barnes et al., 2009). For
this reason, we use the term SDSs to refer to both registered and
unregistered pharmacies. However, pharmacies that are joined to
a clinic and do not serve walk-in clients (clients who have not
been seen by the clinician), are not included in the SDS
categorization.
Because SDSs are a component of the health system, they are
regulated in ways that are similar to other providers. In Kenya, the
pharmaceutical sector is governed by several pieces of legislation,
the main one being the Pharmacy and Poisons Act of 1959. Others
include the Public Health Act of 1961, the Food, Drugs and Chemical
Substances Act of 1965, the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Sub-
stances Act of 1994, as well as Guidelines for GoodWholesaling and
Retail Practice (details on regulations and compliance level pub-
lished elsewhere) (Wafula, Abuya, Amin, & Goodman, 2013). Two
cadres of pharmaceutical qualiﬁcations are recognized in Kenya:
degree (pharmacists) and diploma in pharmaceutical technology
(pharmaceutical technologists). Pharmacists practice following a
four year degree course and one year internship, whereas tech-
nologists study for three years and undertake a six month intern-
ship. The two cadres play a similar role in the retail sector; however,
only pharmacists are allowed to engage in pharmaceutical whole-
sale or importation.
Regulatory enforcement is done by pharmaceutical inspectors
(PIs) and public health ofﬁcers (PHOs). The PIs are employed by the
Pharmacy and Poisons Board (PPB, a semi-independentgovernment body that serves as the medicine regulator) to enforce
pharmaceutical regulations speciﬁcally, and will usually have a
degree or diploma in pharmacy qualiﬁcation. Public health ofﬁcers,
on the other hand, are employed directly by the Ministry of Public
Health to enforce a wider range of regulations governing the health
sector, including those governing SDSs, as well as community hy-
giene practices (such as pit latrines) and hotels. The PHOs typically
have a diploma qualiﬁcation in public health, although some have
university degree qualiﬁcation. The PI and PHO roles are deﬁned by
the Pharmacy and Poisons Act and the Public health Act respec-
tively, hence the overlap in roles. Professional ethics are enforced
by the professional bodies for pharmacists and technologists, but
there is no active association for PHOs.
In 2009, we conducted provider andmystery shopper surveys of
SDSs in two Kenyan districts. The results showed most SDSs were
not complying with regulations, for instance, over half did not keep
prescription records, have a refrigerator, or have staff with phar-
macy qualiﬁcations (survey ﬁndings reported elsewhere) (Wafula
et al., 2013). Non-compliance was higher in rural locations, for
instance, only 12% of rural SDSs had a designated dispensing area,
compared to 43% for urban SDSs. However, regulatory inspection
frequencies were similarly high in rural and urban areas (over 80%
for both). These ﬁndings pointed at inadequacies in regulatory
enforcement, suggesting a need for a detailed understanding of
what happens during inspections, and how this translates into
practices. This study sought to understand how the interaction
between front-line regulators and SDS operators inﬂuences regu-
latory practices, and how organizational factors inﬂuence behav-
iour of regulatory staff.
Regulation theory: the conceptual framework
Scholarly work on regulation has evolved mainly along the
politico-economy pathway, where regulation was seen as either
serving the public interest (the public interest theory) or indi-
vidual groups (interest group theories) (Den Hertog, 2000; Ogus,
2004). While the public interest theory saw regulation as a tool
for correcting market failure, interest group theories depicted it as
a tool for serving the interests of politicians, bureaucrats and
regulated entities. The latter group include regulatory capture, the
Chicago theory, and the public choice theory (Posner, 1974).
However, these older theories have increasingly lost ground, with
more interest going towards understanding the ingredients of
effective regulation (Balleisen & Moss, 2009). There is increasing
interest, for instance, in understanding inﬂuences on regulatory
enforcers, and the interaction between regulators and private
providers. Some of the ideas that have shaped recent debates were
reviewed and developed into a conceptual framework for the
study (see Fig. 1).
At the heart of the conceptual framework is the relationship
between front-line regulatory staff and SDS operators. We drew on
insights from the responsive regulation theory to examine this
relationship. Responsive regulation deﬁnes regulation, not as a
rigid set of rules, but as a tool for addressing the diverse objectives,
structure and operations of the regulated entities (Ayres &
Braithwaite, 1992). The theory proposes that enforcement should
respond to variations in the industry, with severity of sanctions
varying with compliance. We chose the theory based on the
observation that the SDSs operated in vastly different environ-
ments, and that regulatory compliance was varied, despite both
rural and urban SDSs having frequent inspections. However, while
the responsive regulation theory is a normative presentation of
alternative ways of enforcing regulations, we apply its insights to
examine whether and how variations in the SDS market environ-
ment elicit different regulatory responses.
The legal and regulatory framework
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Fig. 1. Conceptual framework e Factors that inﬂuence behaviour of front-line regulatory staff.
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line regulatory staff and SDS operators are both subject to other
inﬂuences. Borrowing from organizational theory, we hypothesized
that regulatory staff will be inﬂuenced by factors such as incentives
and incentive contracts (Meckling & Jensen, 1996; Milgrom &
Roberts, 1992). Milgrom and Roberts argued that ‘organizations
either must rely on individuals to ignore their own self-interests,
with unsurprisingly disappointing results, or else devote in-
genuity and resources to bring coherence between individual self-
interest and the social or organizational objectives’ (Milgrom &
Roberts, 1992). We examined the relationship between the regu-
latory organizational set-up and behaviour of front-line regulatory
staff. This is presented on the left side of the conceptual framework.
Finally, we hypothesized that SDS operators will be inﬂuenced
by broader market forces, including the nature of competition, SDS
operators’ perceptions on the relative importance of different reg-
ulations, and expectations from the broader community. These sets
of factors are presented on the right hand side of the conceptual
framework.Methodology
The study sought to understand how the interaction between
front-line regulatory staff and SDS operators inﬂuences regulatory
compliance among SDSs; how organizational factors inﬂuence the
behaviour of front-line regulatory staff; and how broader market
factors inﬂuence the regulatory practices of SDS operators.Study population and data collection
Data were collected from two districts in Western Kenya e
Bungoma South and Kakamega Centrale using a combination of in-
depth interviews (IDIs) with regulatory staff and focus group dis-
cussions (FGDs) with SDS operators. These were held between
March and June 2011. TheWestern regionwas preferred as SDSs are
known to be numerous there, and therefore of high policy impor-
tance (Abuya et al., 2007; Tavrow, Shabahang, & Makama, 2003).The two districts were selected because they have both rural and
urban settings, thus allowing comparison by location.
The two districts have a high population density (602 for Bun-
goma, and 723 for Kakamega against a national average of 68 per
km2). The commonest causes of morbidity and mortality in the
region are malaria, diarrhoea, respiratory diseases, and HIV/AIDS
(Ministry of Planning, 2008a, 2008b). Both districts have high
poverty levels, with 51 and 54% of individuals living below the
poverty line in Bungoma and Kakamega respectively (Government
of Kenya, 2005). Although both have a major town, the majority of
the population reside in rural locations, which generally have poor
roads. Both districts also suffer from low stafﬁng levels, with the
doctor-patient ratios of 1:26,613 (Bungoma) and 1:20,835 (Kaka-
mega) being way below the national average of approximately
1:5260 (Ministry of Planning, 2008a, 2008b).
A total of 8 FGDs were held, each including 8e12 individuals.
The FGDs sought to understand interactions between regulators
and SDSs (see Table 1).
Focus groups were preferred over individual interviews to allow
operators to discuss the sensitive topic in a relaxed atmosphere,
and enable us to gather information from a large number of pro-
viders. SDS operators were purposively selected to capture a wide
range of experiences (Kuper, Reeves, & Levinson, 2008), and enable
us to test our theoretical assumptions (Seale, 1999). Because the
inquiry sought to explore how regulators respond to variations in
the market, shop locationwas a key factor in SDS selection. We also
aimed to select a range of SDSs in terms of regulatory compliance
drawing on the results of the quantitative surveys conducted in the
same districts (Wafula et al., 2013). SDSs were classiﬁed as better or
poorer performers on the basis of indicators including staff quali-
ﬁcation, dispensing practices, and availability of designated
dispensing areas. Two FGDs were held in rural and urban locations
in each district. The distribution of qualiﬁed personnel varied, with
urban FGDs having more staff with the required pharmacy quali-
ﬁcation. The ﬁrst author (FW) moderated the discussions, with two
ﬁeld staff observing the group dynamics and taking notes.
In-depth interviews explored a number of regulatory factors
(Table 1). Interviewees were selected to represent all levels of
Table 1
Summary of items included in the data tools.
Data tool Items included
Focus group
discussion
topic guide
Experiences with regulatory staff
How specialized drug shop
(SDS) operators respond
to different actions by regulators
Inﬂuence from clients
How SDS operators balance
proﬁt incentive and compliance
In-depth interview
topic guide for
front-line staff
Inspections experiences and
relationships with SDSs
Responsiveness to differences
in practice environments of SDSs
Responsiveness to different
regulatory behaviours of SDSs
Effects of organizational
incentives on performance
Relationships with other
front-line staff
In-depth interview
topic guide for
national managers
Understanding of what
happens at enforcement level
Structure and management
of regulatory organization
Opinions on how enforcement
should be strengthened
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level. We interviewed 3 pharmaceutical inspectors and eight PHOs
working in theWestern region of the country. At the higher levels, a
total of 13 interviews were conducted with several key organiza-
tions, including PPB, the Pharmaceutical Society of Kenya (PSK), the
Kenya Pharmaceutical Association (KPA) and the Department of
Pharmacy at the Ministry of Medical Services. Individual interviews
were preferred for regulators, to capture conﬁdential views, and
because organizing FGDs for inspectors would be logistically
impractical.
Data analysis and ethical clearance
Interview recordings and ﬁeld notes were transcribed, and im-
ported into NVIVO 9 for content analysis. To help identify policy
relevant ﬁndings, a framework analysis approach was adopted
(Ritchie & Spencer, 1994). The thematic framework carried three
headings that reﬂected the conceptual framework: (i) relationship
between front-line staff and SDSs; (ii) organizational inﬂuences,
and; (iii) other factors inﬂuencing SDS operators.
Institutional ethical approval was provided by the KEMRI/
Wellcome Trust Research Programme and the London School of
Hygiene and Tropical Medicine (Application No. 5457), with na-
tional approval by the KEMRI National Ethical Review Committee
(SSC No. 1535). Individual verbal consent was sought from the SDS
attendants participating in the individual and group interviews.
Findings
Findings are discussed in three sections; an exploration of
relationship dynamics between front-line staff and SDS operators;
an examination of organization inﬂuences on front-line staff; and
ﬁnally, a discussion of other factors that inﬂuenced behaviour of
SDS operators.
Relationship between front-line staff and SDS operators
Most SDS operators believed that outcomes of inspections
depended on how they related with regulators. Overall, differences
were observed in relationships between the two front-line cadresand SDS operators, with PIs enjoying collegiate relationships with
urban SDSs, while PHOs enjoyed fairly good relations with rural
SDSs. Variation in relationships appeared to be linked to differences
in SDS operators’ qualiﬁcations, with PIs perceiving rural SDSs as
unlicensed outlets run by “quacks” (a term interviewees used to
describe unqualiﬁed providers). This inﬂuenced their interaction,
with rural operators describing them as unfriendly and
uncompromising.
FGD Participant 3 (rural): ‘when a drug inspector (PI) comes in
your chemist, he looks at you as a quack; someone who doesn’t know
about drugs. Secondly, he will ask about qualiﬁcations, and if you say
certiﬁcate (certiﬁcate in pharmacy), he just enters, takes drugs and
goes with them. They behave harshly with the people in the rural
areas.’
Additionally, rural operators admitted to having little incentive
to improve practices, arguing that they were already perceived as
perpetual offenders. They complained that PIs made little effort to
check for improvements or advise on areas of improvement. This
made them believe that the optimal behaviour in the face of reg-
ulatory inspections was closing shops and running away.
FGD Participant 1 (rural): ‘poor villagers like us; they don’t tell us
anything; just to pick the drugs and we go (to the police station). No
time for communication. How will you begin discussing? Do they have
time? The vehicle is waiting outside (to carry away the drugs).’
Pharmaceutical inspectors on their part, admitted to being un-
friendly towards rural SDSs, arguing that the majority were
managed by “quacks”.
The issue of operators running off during inspections was
widely reported. Whereas operators argued that inspectors came
determined to ﬁnd fault, the inspectors stated that inspections
were not meant to punish those offering a good service. These
regulatory “cat-and-mouse games” resulted in situations where
some shops were not inspected routinely.
Some inspectors admitted that they felt compelled to be more
lenient towards rural providers. One argued that since most qual-
iﬁed operators prefer urban locations, blanket enforcement would
result in closure of most rural SDSs, and negatively impact on
medicine access. This view, which was shared by some senior
regulatory staff, presented a dilemma at policy level, with little
agreement on whether or not to show leniency towards rural
operators.
Pharmaceutical inspector 1: ‘.If you went to some areas and.the
next health centre it is about let’s say 30 km.you see it will change
your thinking. Even if you are handling somebody..as a human being
you may ﬁnd yourself trying to sympathize with this person.’
In sharp contrast to the case with rural operators, PIs enjoyed
cordial relations with urban operators, with the majority of the
operators describing them as friendly and professional.
FGD Participant 4 (urban): ‘.they (PIs) are friendlier because they
are undergoing some training.and realizing whoever is out there is a
colleague.a pharmacist or a technologist.’
The PIs stated that they held professional qualiﬁcations in high
regard, with some even admitting they may ignore the absence of
licenses if staff attending to clients were properly qualiﬁed. Here,
having professional qualiﬁcations was equated to providing good
quality service. Aside from qualiﬁcations, knowledge on pharma-
ceutical treatments appeared to inﬂuence actions taken by PIs.
Here, the inspector would interview the provider to gauge their
level of knowledge, and if satisﬁed, they would allow the individual
to continue running the shop without a license.
Unlike PIs who were recognized across all SDSs, PHOs’ legiti-
macywas limitedmainly to rural shops. This stemmed from the fact
that rural operators received regular visits from PHOs, who had
good community penetration. The rural operators described PHOs
as understanding, with the PHOs saying that although most rural
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ﬁlling the gaps in health provision. In contrast, most urban opera-
tors did not see PHOs as legitimate regulators, arguing that they
held no pharmacy training. As a result, PHOs described urban op-
erators as ‘arrogant’, particularly those with a pharmacy degree.
Amajor consequence of the nature of interaction between front-
line regulators and SDS operators was corruption, which was re-
ported in three related forms: (a) an institutionalized form, where
bribes were embedded in interactions, (b) an aggressive form
where enforcers created opportunities to collect bribes, and, (c) a
subtle form where operators offered bribes for speciﬁc mistakes
found during inspections.
The institutionalized form, reported mainly in rural locations,
entailed routine payment of bribes. Inspectors rarely asked for
bribes directly (after the initial encounters); instead, they expected
operators to send money periodically to keep inspections away.
Such was the level of entrenchment of the practice that operators
admitted using M-PESA to send bribes (M-PESA is a mobile phone
money transfer system that leaves the recipient’s details on the
sender’s phone).
FGD Participant 1 (rural): ‘.you build a relationship eventually,
and when they know you, then obviously after sometime you M-Pesa
some money. You will be in safe books now (laughter).if you want to
be safer, don’t wait for him to come or to call you. Tell him (miming
phone call) “Mister, today I am sending you 2000 (Shillings), okay!”
You are now keeping him away. So, even if they know you, it is not like
they will stop expecting money.’
Aside from ignoring infringements, the regulators involved
routinely warned operators ‘within their friendship networks’ of
impending inspections, thus according them time to close shops.
FGD Participant 8 (rural): ‘So, if an inspectoremy friende tells me
that next week is bad! Then I tell this gentleman (points at colleague)
that next week, be ready, then he tells his friend then the network
continues (laughter). Everybody will close that week. The inspectors
will just arrest an unfortunate person who was not in that network.’
Like the previous form, the aggressive form of corruption was
reported mainly in rural areas. Here, the operators saw regulators
as opportunists who took advantage of the illegal status of busi-
nesses to demand bribes. Power relations were clear here, with
operators presenting themselves as victims and depicting in-
spectors as villains, as opposed to the previous form where the
operators saw themselves as beneﬁciaries of the ‘network’.
FGD Participant 5 (rural): ‘.some of the (regulatory) personnel
will keep on watching you; when they realize that you are growing,
they start setting traps. Sort of interfering with you whereby any little
proﬁt that you have gotten, they want to interfere in the name of
threats.’
The ﬁnal form of corruption, reported across both urban and
rural locations, was where operators offered bribes to avoid con-
sequences of non-compliance. In this form, bribes were offered to
cover irregularities spotted during inspections. The distinguishing
feature here is that enforcers and operators did not have estab-
lished relationships. This form reportedly extended to the national-
level enforcers, who made occasional regulatory visits to different
parts of the country. Some operators described the national in-
spectors as being particularly ‘expensive’ to bribe.
Aside from corruption, there were reports of high-handedness
among inspectors. Operators complained that inspectors carried
away medicines, and that these drugs were rarely traceable after-
wards. The PIs, on their part, argued that past experiences with a
corrupt judiciary and police had forced them to adopt militant
enforcement strategies. They argued that there was little sense in
instituting legal proceedings, knowing well that the offenders
would get off with small ﬁnes. Seizing medicines was thus seen as a
more effective form of punishment.Organizational inﬂuences on behaviour of front-line staff
The PIs were generally fewer than PHOs, with the latter having a
stronger community presence. The wider community penetration
allowed PHOs to have more detailed information on location and
practices of SDSs, particularly in remote areas, which is where PHO
activities focus primarily. This, in turn, inﬂuenced the way PHOs
related to operators and the broader communities, with the ma-
jority acknowledging that they felt likemembers of the community.
All PHOs were clear that they report to the public health ofﬁce at
the district level.
Unlike PHOs, there was confusion on the reporting structure for
PIs because, while the PHOs’ chain of command ended with district
authorities, PIs reported to district and national (PPB) managers.
This resulted in inter-personal variations in reporting behaviour,
with some PIs reporting to the district routinely, while others went
about their duties without involving the district management. This
reduced PI effectiveness, as their activities were not ﬁtted within
the overall district health plans and they therefore could not access
district resources.
PI 1: ‘.They (rural SDSs) don’t respect you because they know you
are not empowered logistically. They fear the Nairobi people because
they come with big vehicles. Here, you borrow a vehicle, there is no
fuel, so you just tell someone “I will come back you will see”. You keep
using threats. Because you can’t afford to buy police lunch. he can’t
come! Those Nairobi people come with money, big vehicles, take po-
licemen, do their job and go. You you’re just seen as any ordinary
person’
Aside from confusion over reporting, there was an overall lack of
clarity over which staff should enforce which regulations, resulting
in conﬂicts between PHOs and PIs. Whereas the PHOs’ role in
inspecting hygiene and structural aspects of SDSs was accepted,
there was disagreement on whether they should inspect pharma-
ceutical aspects. The PIs accused PHOs of encouraging the mush-
rooming of unlicensed outlets by giving unqualiﬁed personnel
permission to operate. The guarded relationship resulted in little
collaboration between the two cadres.
PI 1: ‘.most unlicensed people don’t know what PPB is! You go
there, they show you a license (and say) “I went to the PHO’s ofﬁce I
have a license”. The person looks surprised that there is another license
they need. In fact most illegal outlets have passed through the hands of
PHOs.’
As far as incentives go, both PHOs and PIs felt that little had been
done overall with regard to incentivising enforcement. To improve
performance, PPB had instituted monthly salary top-ups for PIs,
year-end shopping vouchers, as well as a system of performance
contracts. The salary top-ups were ﬁxed; they were not pegged on
speciﬁc performancemeasures. Although the PIs appreciated these,
they conceded that they did not encourage one to surpass targets.
Public health ofﬁcers, on the other hand, received neither top-ups
nor vouchers.
Performance contracts were signed by both PHOs and PIs. The
contracts outlined goals that individuals were required to ach-
ieve over an agreed period. However, the focus of the contracts
varied across PIs and PHOs, with the former being more speciﬁc
to SDSs (for instance, conducting at least 3 successful court cases
every month) and the latter touching on broader public health
targets (such as pit latrine coverage). However, while continual
failure to achieve targets reportedly led to dismissal or other
forms of punishment, the linkage between performance evalu-
ation and beneﬁts was relatively unclear. Staff also questioned
the usefulness of some performance indicators, for instance, one
PI wondered what would happen if good compliance was ach-
ieved by operators in an area, and there were no cases to
prosecute.
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The SDSs were heavily inﬂuenced by client demands, which
varied with location. In rural areas, operators spoke mainly of
helping the community, which they felt they were an integral part
of. Selling partial doses of medicines, for instance, was seen as an
act of empathy, particularly when directed towards those less able
to meet the full treatment costs.
FGD participant 1 (rural): ‘.most of us deal with very poor people.
They come with 5 bob (Shillings), and they want a drug that is worth
the 5 Shillings, and yet you are not supposed to sell a drug that is not a
full dose. And you live with him; you are in a village chemist. If you
deny him, that is a problem. So you try all means to give him that
medicine that is worth 5 Shillings.’
In urban areas, on the other hand, operators acceded to client
demands mainly to ward off competition. There was a general
conviction that one either ‘sells or perishes’. In their eyes, failing to
satisfy clients’ demands simply meant more business for the seller
next door.
FGD Participant 6 (urban): ‘I remember when I opened the busi-
ness, I found a very professional pharmacist and people had run away.
I made some good money which was meant for that professional. He
had just come from developed countries and he was imagining this is
that country. So he went down because people were not ready to lis-
ten..people want ‘give me Panadol!’ you give. You don’t ask..’
The operators also complained of unfair competition, noting
that compliers faced higher costs than those operating outside the
law. However, not all urban operators subscribed to the ‘sell or
perish’ notion. Some felt that doing so went against professional
ethics, arguing that clients appreciated good advice over time, even
if it meant refusing to sell inappropriately. There were instances
where acceding to client demands resulted in tension between
trying to remain professional and staying aﬂoat in the competitive
business. Some urban operators believed that qualiﬁed individuals
were less likely to engage in unlawful behaviour, and that the lay
public could differentiate professionals from “quacks”. For that
reason, they went the extra mile to provide good care, which
included asking questions, scrutinizing prescriptions, making call-
backs to prescribers and sending clients for laboratory tests.
Discussion
The problem of poor regulatory compliance has been widely
reported among medicine retailers. However, little has been done
to understand the underlying reasons, particularly with regard to
the role played by regulatory staff. This was the main objective of
the study.
The study found relationships to be a strong determinant of
regulatory practices overall. The relationships varied across the
staff cadres, with PIs and PHOs enjoying good relationships with
urban and rural operators respectively. Urban operators responded
to formal rules, with their rural counterparts responding more to
perceptions of social standing. In the end, the two sets of re-
lationships resulted in separate regulatory streams in urban and
rural areas, exemplifying the inﬂuence of social and cultural
context on regulatory enforcement. The importance of contextual
norms in determining success of regulatory interventions has been
emphasized elsewhere (Mackintosh & Tibandebage, 2002), and
underscores the value of considering pre-existing relationships
when designing regulations. The two streams also point at the
existence of a responsive regulatory relationship, albeit different
from Ayres and Braithwaite’s form (Ayres & Braithwaite, 1992).
Responsive regulation describes an enforcement system where
steps taken by enforcers depend on actions of the regulated en-
tities. While the original theory entails the use of incentives anddisincentives to build a compliance culture, the responsiveness
here reﬂected a combination of savvy pursuit of personal goals, and
effort to attain the broad public health objective of access in a
market characterized by a rigid and unresponsive set of rules.
The ﬁrst form of responsiveness was linked to self-serving ac-
tions, where regulators would collect bribes from operators, who in
turn received favourable decisions and inspection warnings. Here,
regulations were simply not being adhered to, and rather than face
each other on different sides of the law, the operators and regula-
tors opted for a perverse equilibrium from a societal perspective,
that would serve their individual goals. This equilibrium, which
made entrenching a culture of compliance difﬁcult, led us to
refocus our analysis from a qualitative description of reasons un-
derlying gaps between regulations and practices, to an inquiry into
what happens when a rigid system of rules is designed to apply
uniformly, with little recognition of socio-cultural inﬂuences and
contextual norms. It appears regulators were resigned to the fact
that regulations could simply not be enforced uniformly; this,
coupled with the weak incentives and poor monitoring from their
organizations, contributed to the corruption reported.
Not all responsiveness was linked to self-serving actions. There
were instances where regulators adjusted decisions based on the
practice environments of the SDSs. This form of responsiveness,
whichwe call the ‘adaptive’ type, appeared to have had the blessing
of some senior staff. Geographical location was the main determi-
nant here, with regulators subscribing to an unwritten consensus to
show leniency towards rural SDSs. This is not unique to Kenya; in
Sri-Lanka, food and drug inspectors admitted to being lenient to-
wards rural pharmacies, according them more time to meet regu-
latory requirements, rather than closing them down as required by
law (Attanayake & Siyambalagoda, 2003). Such leniency is sug-
gestive of an informal system of ‘levels of practice’, where in-
dividuals with lower qualiﬁcations are allowed to operate in low-
access areas, with their more qualiﬁed counterparts operating in
the more lucrative areas.
There were cases of regulators advising operators on areas of
improvement, and agreeing on timelines withinwhich the changes
should be effected. This strategy was built on the thought that in-
dividuals have plural motivations for complying (and not-
complying), and that appropriate deployment of compliance and
deterrent strategies can result in a culture of compliance (Ayres &
Braithwaite, 1992; Nielson & Parker, 2009). However, successful
deployment of such a strategy needs regulators to make operators
believe that penalties will be instituted (if required), a phenomenon
referred to as ‘deploying the benign big gun’ under responsive
regulation theory. The benign big gun would be ineffective, for
instance, in situations where deployment of sanctions relies on
activities of others beyond the control of the regulator. In this study,
regulators complained of slowness in the judiciary systems, a
problem they circumvented by employing a ‘scorched earth policy
approach’, where infringing operators would be paralysed through
commodity conﬁscation. In the end, it was fear of losing com-
modities, rather than facing the law, that rendered the benign big
gun effective. Unfortunately, this approach resulted in regulatory
cat-and-mouse games, with operators believing that compliance
was an all or none phenomenon, and that incremental improve-
ments carried no beneﬁts.
While relationships were central in determining practices, the
structure and management of the regulatory organizations were
equally important. By virtue of their nature, regulatory organiza-
tions are expected to face problems of agency relationships. Agency
refers to relationships where principals delegate responsibilities to
agents in order to beneﬁt from the latter’s ability to execute the
tasks (Eisenhardt, 1989). In this study, front-line staff were the
agents of the regulatory managers. As predicted, problems of
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on incentivising and monitoring performance. While some mone-
tary incentives were provided, these were poorly linked to
performance.
Performance contracting, on the other hand, had a more precise
formulation, outlining targets that staff were required to achieve
over set periods. However, while consequences of persistent failure
were well explained, the link between performance evaluation and
beneﬁts was relatively unclear. Such systems run the risk of
creating scenarios where staff look to attain the set goals, but have
little incentive to surpass targets. Unfortunately, designing con-
tracts that show clear linkage between performance and reward is
not easy, especially considering that good incentive contracts often
have a combination of subjective and objective measures of per-
formance (Baker, Gibbons, & Murphy, 1994; Levin, 2003). This also
brings to the fore the problems of evaluating performance in sys-
tems where indicators are hard to design. Tying compensation to
poorly measured performance outcomes transfers greater risk to
front-line staff, which would entitle them to higher compensation
(Holmstrom, 1979; Holmstrom & Milgrom, 1991). In Kenya, PI
performance measures included indicators such as the number of
cases prosecuted per month. Herein lay the problem, as prosecu-
tion depended on multiple factors, most of which were outside the
control of the inspectors (such as efﬁciency in the judiciary
departments).
Two other important inﬂuences on SDS behaviour were client
expectations and competition. Client demand inﬂuenced practices,
albeit in different ways, across the 2 locations. Rural operators
described their clientele as mainly interested in low prices and
ﬂexibility in quantities of medicines purchased. To rural operators,
charging high prices meant less business, regardless of whether the
prices were accompanied by better pharmaceutical care or the
assurance of a high quality product. Perhaps in response to this,
rural operators were engaged in what appeared to be a “race to the
bottom” competition, where those most able to sell medicines at
the lowest cost, and those most willing to sell medicines in the
smallest units possibly won (yet under dosing can result in
incomplete cure and resistance). Such competition is bound to
result in adverse selection of quality, where operators offering high
quality services are driven out of business and replaced by low-
quality suppliers, whose product still meets the approval of the
market (whose ability to infer quality is limited). Urban operators,
on the other hand, were said to have a ‘ﬂoor on quality,’ despite the
higher competition. The competitive environment had conditioned
urban SDSs into offering more services, with operators going out of
their way to show clients that they were qualiﬁed, resulting in
practices such as counselling on medication use. The competition
appeared to have improved urban SDS services, but worsened those
of rural SDSs.
Two potential limitations with the study were failure to inter-
view certain actors, and the generalizability of the study. One
potentially useful set of interviews not done due to logistical con-
straints, were police superintendent interviews. These interviews
would have provided insight on how the regulatory staff work with
the police, and the challenges thatmay arise from the collaboration.
As far as generalizability is concerned, datawere collected from two
districts known to have similar epidemiological proﬁles and rela-
tively high retail sector activity (Abuya, 2008; Tavrow et al., 2003).
Previous work has also shown theWestern region of the country to
have a relatively good geographic access to public health facilities
compared to other parts (Noor, Alegana, Gething, & Snow, 2009). As
a result, the ﬁndings are unlikely to represent the full range of
operatoreregulator interactions across rural districts in other parts
of the country. However, theoretical insights can be extrapolated
beyond the study area; for instance, one might expect the wayfront-line staff and SDS operators interact to also be an inﬂuence
regulatory practices in other parts of the country. One might also
expect the organizational factors that inﬂuenced regulatory staff to
apply to regulators working in other parts of the country. What
would, perhaps be less appropriate, is applying theoretical argu-
ments developed here to major cities such as Nairobi. It is none-
theless expected that behaviour patterns in larger towns would
somewhat resemble those reported across the urban locations of
the study districts.
A number of policy implications arise from the study. Firstly,
laws should be streamlined to clarify the roles of different front-line
staff. Secondly, policy needs to recognize that interactions and re-
lationships at the enforcement level have a strong inﬂuence on
regulatory practices. Regulations would do well, for instance, to
build on the inﬂuence PHOs have across the rural locations, where
the Pharmacy and Poisons Board’s regulatory machinery has failed
to have a sustained impact. This may mean either incorporating
PHOs into the formal PPB regulatory structure, or devising alter-
native regulatory arrangements to govern rural SDSs.
More thought should also go towards adopting levels of practice.
Such lower levels, often referred to as part II drug shops, are legally
recognized in Uganda and Tanzania for instance (Health Research
for Action, 2006; Jacobs, Whitworth, Kambugu, & Pool, 2004).
Under this arrangement, individuals would be allowed to sell a
limited range of medicines in underserved areas, preferably
following short dispensing courses. This would ensure public
health objectives are met in an environment characterized by rigid
statutory provisions. It would also promote equity, as individuals in
remote areas would have access to formally regulated SDSs. It may
mean shifting the regulation of the lower level SDSs from the
professionals-driven pharmaceutical ﬁeld to the public health ﬁeld,
where regulation would be deﬁned in terms of public health ob-
jectives. Aside from ensuring expanded service provision, allowing
lower practice levels would bring more SDSs within the law, thus
providing an entry point for interventions such as training and
providing educational materials. However, unless carefully thought
through and communicated, this approach may encounter resis-
tance from pharmacy professionals, who may see it as an
encroachment on their profession. A move towards levels of prac-
tice would therefore need a consultative approach, with effort
going into showing how such a systemwould beneﬁt professionals
in practice.
As far as regulatory organizational management is concerned,
policy should explore incentive structures that are clearly tied to
the goals of regulation.
Conclusion
This study used FGDs and individual interviews to understand
how the nature of interaction between regulators and SDS opera-
tors translates into regulatory practices.
Relationships between regulators and operators were found to
have a strong inﬂuence on regulatory behaviour, often resulting in
perverse outcomes such as corruption. It also emerged that sepa-
rate regulatory streams operated in urban and rural locations,
based on the differing nature of relationships, the competition
environment and expectations from the community. As a result, we
recommended that policy should introduce lower retail practice
requirements for rural SDSs in recognition of the vast differences in
rural and urban practice environments. This would allow shops
operating unlawfully to be brought within the regulatory frame-
work without affecting practice in urban locations.
A more radical approach would be separating the professionals-
operated pharmaceutical sector, whose goals include protection of
the profession, from the more socially ﬂuid public health sector,
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ments within rural communities. This would result in a situation
where pharmacists maintain control of the high business potential
areas, while the public health department seeks alternative ways of
licensing non-pharmacists to provide essential commodities in
rural areas.
As far as operations of front-line staff are concerned, the reg-
ulatory system was found to lack effective incentive structures to
encourage regulatory enforcement. While there were some in-
centives for pharmaceutical inspectors, there was lack of clarity
on how these related to performance, with enforcers feeling that
the level of effort had no bearing on professional advancement.
The recommendation is that regulatory organizations should
explore ways of linking incentives and professional development
to performance.
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